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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF UTAH
THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
v.
Case No. 890657-CA
Priority No. 2

BRUCE AARON ELLIS,
Defendant/Appellant.

INTRODUCTION
Defendant/Appellant BRUCE AARON ELLIS relies on his opening
brief and also refers this Court to that brief for the statements of
jurisdiction, the issues, the case, and the facts. Appellant
replies to the State's brief as follows.

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
Mr. Ellis properly requested and preserved his lesser
included offense argument.

At trial, he requested that the court

"submit this matter to the jury as an assault, a simple
assault . . . ."

Subsequent statements by Mr. Ellis confirmed,

rather than negated, his prior request.
The Information and the jury instruction focused only on
whether Mr. Ellis used "means or force likely to produce death or
serious bodily injury . . . ." Any evidence (the photographs or
testimony) addressing the end result was prejudicial because of its
potential for misleading the jury.

ARGUMENT
POINT I
DEFENDANT REQUESTED THE LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSE
INSTRUCTION
(Reply to Point I of Appellee's Brief)
In its brief, the State concedes, "Defendant correctly
states that he moved the court to dismiss the aggravated assault and
to submit the matter to the jury as a simple assault."
brief at 8.

Appellee's

Thereafter, however, the State argued, "Having failed

to request a lesser included instruction on simple assault,
defendant is in no position to argue on appeal that the trial court
erred in not giving such an instruction."

Appellee's brief at 10.

The resolution of this apparent contradiction requires a
reexamination of the involved motion.
at 13 n.3.

See Appellant's opening brief

After the court excused the jury, the following

discussion took place:
THE COURT:

You can proceed, [Defense counsel].

[Defense counsel]: Thank you, your Honor. Your
Honor, the court stated yesterday that I might make
any appropriate motions today rather than yesterday
when the state initially rested.
Your Honor, it would be our motion to dismiss the
aggravated assault count and to ask the court to
submit this matter to the jury as an assault, a simple
assault in terms of the state's evidence presented.
(TB 14) (emphasis added).
Hence, defense counsel made clear his request for a lesser
included offense instruction.

(TB 14).
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His remaining arguments in

support of the motion stressed repeatedly how the State had failed
to prove the element, "likely to produce serious bodily injury."
Cf. (R 69) (emphasis added).

Simple "bodily injury," however, was

not then an element of dispute:
[Defense counsel]: In order to establish [a] prima
facie case of aggravated assault I believe that the
state is required to submit prima facie evidence that
this injury that was suffered by Mr. Drew was likely
to produce death or serious bodily injury. The
evidence that has been presented by Dr. Howe in no way
indicates that this was serious bodily injury, and in
fact, I believe that his evidence is to the contrary.
THE COURT: Well, the question is not whether it was
serious bodily injury, it was whether it was likely.
I mean, if you use someone with a gun [sic] and it
doesn't happen to hurt them, that's still aggravated
assault. If they shoot them with a pea shooter and it
kills them, that's not.
[Defense counsel]: I understand the court's point,
and I'll address that. [The "seriousness" of the
wound was again addressed.]

And the argument that the defense would proffer is
that they've not met the prima facie burden of
providing serious bodily injury or the likelihood that
it would. There was no evidence elicited to that
specific point. He was not asked did this constitute
serious bodily injury, nor did any of his answers
elicit it, either through direct or cross-examination
at any point ever indicate that this was in fact
serious bodily injury.
THE COURT: Okay. Well, I don't think I can take that
from the jury. I think they could find beyond a
reasonable doubt that serious bodily injury—the deep
scar, a deep cut, long cut, lots of tissue that was
damaged close to a nerve—I think they could find that
it was likely to create serious bodily injury. I
think the injury is pretty serious, so I think under
those circumstances I'm going to deny that motion.
(TB 14-16).
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The trial court thus acknowledged and denied Mr. Ellis'
motion.

Nevertheless, as stated previously, "Even if the jury

should have been able to consider the aggravated assault charge, the
court should not have refused 'to submit this matter to the jury as
an assault, a simple assault in terms of the state's evidence
presented.

The evidence provided the jury with a reasonable basis

for Ellis' simple assault theory."

Appellant's opening brief at 9

(emphasis added) (citations omitted).
Since Mr. Ellis' motion had already been denied, his
subsequent use of the word "We've" reflected only a past intention
and his deference to the trial court's ruling.

His present

intention, evidenced by the term, "we're," did not negate his past
motion;
THE COURT:

. . . Anything further, [Defense counsel]?

[Defense counsel]: No, your Honor. I suppose I would
need to, for purposes of my record, make a motion for
a directive verdict on forwarding the same theories,
your Honor, that this court should direct a verdict of
no more than—well, a verdict of not guilty. We've
not—we're not offering a lesser included offense, so
I believe that the court should find that a jury
cannot find beyond a reasonable doubt that the state
has proved its case, and should direct a verdict of
not guilty.
THE COURT: Okay, that motion is on the record, and
for the record it will be denied.
(TB 16); see also Appellant's opening brief at 13 n.3.
Although the State emphasized selected portions of the
above exchange, Appellee's brief at 9, it offered no explanation for
the motion already submitted and denied by the trial court.
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Again, the State's argument has

merit only if Mr. Ellis' prior motion was ignored, a position not
taken by Appellant.1
The State additionally argues that the trial court's denial
of Ellis' motion was a response "only to his motion to dismiss the
aggravated assault count."

Appellee's brief at 9.

In essence, the

State urges, because the trial court did not specifically address
Mr. Ellis' motion "to submit this matter to the jury as an assault,
a simple assault in terms of the state's evidence presented[,]"
(TB 14), he did not preserve his issue for appeal.

The trial

court's general denial of Ellis' two pronged motion did not negate
the existence of his request for the lesser included offense.
Mr. Ellis properly preserved and presented his theory of the case.

POINT II
THE PHOTOGRAPHS WERE PREJUDICIAL BECAUSE THEY
MISDIRECTED THE JURY'S ATTENTION WITH CONSIDERATIONS
NOT RELEVANT TO ITS VERDICT
In its brief, the State acknowledges that "the jury was
instructed under [Utah Code Ann. §] 76-5-103(1)(b) only."
Appellee's brief at 2.

Thus, "[t]he photographs and all testimony

on anything other than the throwing motion of the defendant were

1

When the trial court denied Mr. Ellis' motion it made a
mistake, period. The court did not knowingly ignore Ellis' motion,
nor did it knowingly refuse "to instruct on simple assault when it
believed it appropriate." Appellee's brief at 10. To suggest "bad
faith" or anything other than a legal error, as the State has done,
is to read far too much into the arguments stated simply by
Appellant.
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threw it "off handed," (TA 1 0 7 ) , Ellis' awkward actions may

not have constituted "such means or force likely to produce death or
serious bodily injury . . . ."

(R 69). 2 If the doctor had

testified that an "off handed" throw by a person who "just had
surgery on [his other] arm[,]" (TA 143), lacked balance and
coordination, that testimony may have been proper.

Anything else

focused improperly on the end result.
Consequently, while the State may have been correct in
quoting the foregoing standard, its emphasis was misplaced.

The

proper focus is underscored as follows:
We have frequently stated and applied the rule that
color photographs of the body of the victim - even
photographs that are gruesome - are not inadmissible
if they are probative of essential facts, even though
they may be cumulative of other evidence.
State v. Garcia, 663 P.2d 60, 63 (Utah 1983) (emphasis added);
Appellee's brief at 14.

By negative implication, photographs should

be inadmissible if they are not probative of essential facts.
The harmless error analysis is inapplicable here although
Mr. Ellis acknowledges that it may have applied under different
circumstances.

See Appellant's opening brief at 23.

Because no

such circumstances exist in the case at bar, a new trial is
warranted.

2

Mr. Ellis' motion for a directed verdict on the
aggravated assault charge was therefore also erroneously denied.
(TA 16).
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CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, Bruce Ellis respectfully requests
that his conviction be reversed and the case remanded to the trial
court for a new trial or dismissal.
SUBMITTED this SO

day of February, 1990.

BROOKE C. WELLS
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant

RON) S. FtklNO
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant

CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY
I, RON S. FUJINO, hereby certify that eight copies of the
foregoing will be delivered to the Utah Court of Appeals, 400
Midtown Plaza, 230 South 500 East, Salt Lake City, Utah 84102, and
four copies to the Attorney General's Office, 236 State Capitol,
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114, this ^O

day of February, 1990.

RON\S. FUJINO

- 9

-

DELIVERED by

this

of February, 1991.

- 10 -

day

